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The routing of packets through an overlay network designed to limit DDoS attacks is analyzed. The overlay network 
structure includes special purpose nodes which affect the routes taken through the overlay.  Two main factors are 
considered: the routing algorithm utilized for the overlay and the method for selecting the special purpose nodes. 
The routing algorithms considered are based on methods originally defined for peer-to-peer services.  A model was 
developed for the overlay network which allowed altering the routing algorithm, method for selection of special 
purpose nodes and the underlying ISP structure. The model was used to assess the impact of specific routing 
algorithms and selection methods on latency and path length. The implications of utilizing a specific method for 
node selection on the probability of a successful DDoS attack is briefly discussed.  
1. Introduction 
A method of utilizing an overlay network to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service attack is described 
in Secure Overlay Service (SOS) [1]. The method utilizes special purpose nodes and filtering to reduce the 
probability of an attack successfully blocking traffic to a specific destination. SOS alters the route to the 
destination by requiring packets pass through specific nodes, which may be dynamically selected, in order 
be permitted access to the destination.  As a result, the route a packet traverses to the destination may be 
significantly different than the route normally taken through ISP(s). This paper summarizes the impacts of 
two algorithms for routing packets through the overlay network in accordance with the requirements 
imposed by SOS. These are combined with rules for selecting the special purpose nodes. Specifically, the 
change in expected latency and number of cities through which the route passes as compared to the normal 
route are presented. 
2. Background 
2.1 Terminology 
The following terminology will be used: 
• Access Point: A node which provides access into the overlay network. 
• Beacon: A node in the overlay which receives traffic destined for a target and forwards the traffic 
to a servlet for the target. 
• Client: A customer of the ISP. The term is used to refer to LANs connected to the ISP.  
• Normal Route: A route which is based only on the destination address and thus can follow a route 
used by regular traffic through an ISP. Shortest path based on hops is used in the model.  
• Overlay network: In the context of this paper, the term will refer to an overlay which contains the 
beacons, servlets and access points as required by  SOS. The nodes may be within  ISP(s) or client 
nodes. 
• Overlay Route: A route that requires sending to a packet to one of more overlay nodes in order to 
reach a node which has information about the destination and can then use a normal route to the 
intermediate or final destination. 
• POP: Point  of Presence. The term is used to refer to the main routing hubs in an ISP network. 
Two nodes will be referred to as being served by or on the same POP if they are clients that 
connect into routers within the POP. 
• Servlet: A node in the overlay which provides access to the target.  
• SOS: Secure Overlay Service. SOS route will be used to refer to the route a packet travels when 
SOS is applied. 
• Source: A node from which legitimate traffic to a target originates. 
• Special purpose nodes: This will refer collectively to access points, servlets and  beacons. 
• Target: A destination node that may be subject to an attack. 
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2.2 SOS 
The goal of SOS is to prevent denial of service attacks via  a combination of traditional packet  filtering for 
security and the use of an overlay network to provide a level of concealment. Two types of special purpose 
nodes, servlets and beacons, are utilized by SOS for routing packets to a destination. Given a set of overlay 
nodes, the target for a particular service selects one or more overlay nodes to act as servlets. Each servlet 
then selects one or more overlay nodes to act as beacons.  All packets destined for the target must pass 
through a servlet. Only the beacons know which node(s) act as servlets for a given target, thus all packets 
destined for the target must pass through the appropriate beacon to find the servlet. Packets from a  source 
destined for the target are required to route from source to an access point to enter the overlay. The packet 
routes through the overlay until a beacon is reached which can direct it to the servlet for the target. Upon 
reaching the servlet, the packet will be forwarded to the target.  If a node leaves the overlay, another 
overlay node will assume its responsibilities. The target node may at any point in time change the nodes 
acting as its servlets and a servlet may change the nodes acting as its beacons. 
 
 
Figure 1: SOS Architecture 
2.3 Routing Algorithms  
Before describing the model, overviews of two peer to peer routing algorithms are provided as background 
material for understanding the routing algorithms utilized in the overlay network. The first is CHORD [3], 
which [1] suggests using as the mechanism for overlay routing. The 2nd is Content Addressable Networks 
(CAN) [2], of which a variation is used in the model as an alternative to CHORD. The following describes 
the general routing algorithms for CHORD and CAN. Refer to [3] and [2] for details regarding how the 
overlay is maintained when nodes leave or join it. 
2.3.1 CHORD 
In CHORD, each node is assigned an id via a hash function. The nodes in the overlay are ordered by their 
ids. Conceptually this can be viewed as a circle.  
 
 
Figure 2: CHORD Overlay Routing  
 
Let 2m be the number of possible ids. Let x denote the id of an overlay node. Each overlay node contains a 
table of m entries , the ith entry is the 1st overlay node whose id is ≥ x + 2i-1 (mod 2m), as shown in the 
diagram. For a node not in the overlay whose is assigned id y by the hash function, the overlay node whose 
id is closest to but ≥ y will store information about y, such as z’s IP address. If overlay node x receives a 
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≤ y’s id. In the example, if node 7 receives a packet for node 20, the packet will route from 7 to 16 to 17, 
When the packet reaches node 17, the next node in the overlay is 22. Node 17 checks that it does not have 
the information for node 20 and knows that 22 is the next node in the overlay, thus 22 must contain node 
20’s information.  The CHORD algorithm results in packets being routed around the overlay “circle”, while  
progressively  getting closer to the desired overlay node.  O(log n) overlay nodes may be visited, where n is 
the size of the overlay. Notice that there is no rule for determining the relationship between overlay node 
ids. Two nodes with consecutive ids could be any geographical distance from each other.  
2.3.2 CAN 
CAN maps objects using a hash function to a point in the coordinate space. Each overlay node is 
responsible for a section of the space. After determining the point to which an object is mapped, the overlay 
node responsible for the region containing the point is used to store the object’s information. For the 
purpose of this paper, consider the object to be a node and the information to be its IP address. Each 
overlay node contains a table of overlay nodes responsible for neighboring areas in the coordinate space. 
As shown in Figure 3, overlay node 7 would contain pointers to nodes 3,6,8 and 11. In its basic form CAN 
does not assume any relationship between node positions of the coordinate space and their geographical 
positions in the real world. A variation suggested in [2] regarding the coordinate space being representative 
of the geography provided the basis for the heuristic used in the model.   
 
Figure 3: Overlay Nodes Serving Regions of a Coordinate Space. 
3. Model 
3.1 Purpose 
In order to understand the impacts of the overlay network on the routing of packets between the source and 
target nodes, the SOS algorithm was applied to two models of ISP networks. One model was for the United 
States based on AT&T’s network  and one was for Europe based on Worldcom’s network. These are shown 
in Figures 5 and 6. Refer to [4] for additional maps of ISP networks. While the US model was based on 
AT&T’s network, remote access points were excluded from the model. Connections from Worldcom’s 
European POPs to points outside the area shown in 6 were excluded from the Europe model. For each 
model, two algorithms for routing traffic through the overlay were tested, one based on CHORD, which 
uses a random ordering of the overlay nodes, and a heuristic based on the variation of CAN using a 
geographical ordering of the overlay nodes. In all cases, variations on how the beacons and servlets were 
chosen in relation to each other, to the target and to the source were tested; for example, requiring some 
minimum distance between the servlet and target. 
The purpose for constructing the model was to determine the affects of the algorithm on the number of 
hops, distance and latency. The effects of increased traffic generated by an attacker on the route were not 
included because it was assumed that the links between ISPs pops are utilized at less than capacity such 
that the choke points in any route using an overlay are points outside of the ISPs main backbone. For 
example, if the ISP has average utilization of 60% to 80% on OC192 links, the attacker would not be able 
to consume the bandwidth between two of the ISP's POPs. The model was also not required to determine 
the probability of a successful attack. This is the probability that the attacker determined either the target's 
location and/or all access point locations and/or all overlay nodes and was able to take them out of service. 
In [1], it is assumed filtering around the target in high bandwidth areas prevents unauthorized traffic from 
reaching the target and consuming the entire bandwidth on the links to the target. Therefore, a successful 





Analysis of Routing Algorithms for Secure Overlay Services 
DLC 4/22/02 4 
case where there are 100K clients eligible to be overlay nodes and 1000 are used in the overlay. Also 
assume the target selects two servlets and there are more than two access points. The attacker would have 
to take at least two nodes, the servlets in this case, out of service and be able to do so repeatedly since the 
target will automatically select new servlets.  If the attacker knows which nodes participate in the overlay, 
the probability of correctly guessing  the servlets once for a specific target is < 0.001%. If the overlay nodes 
are not known, this becomes < 10-9 %. Thus the probability of locating the appropriate attack points is 
negligible. 
3.2 Network Layout 
A representation of the ISP at the POP level was created. Each POP was assumed to consist of a hierarchy 
of routers as shown in Figure 4. At the top level are routers with links to other POPs. At the lowest level are 
links to client LANs.  
 
 
Figure 4: ISP POP Structure in Model 
 
Latencies between POPs were estimated from a subset of known latencies, assuming adequate bandwidth is 
available. Distance between POPs were based on airline miles due to facility miles not being available. 
Assuming the facility miles between POPs are proportional to the airline miles, estimating the distances 
and latencies do not affect the final results, which reflect the ratio of the latency when using SOS to that of 
the normal route. The estimates did not impact the number of hops in a route. Three routers were included 
at the second level and twelve at the lowest level of each POP; however, for the statistics computed, the 
exact number of routers within a POP was not relevant, only the latency from the time a packet entered a 
router within a POP to the time it left the POP was needed. 
While the model assumed adequate bandwidth between POPs and that the choke points would be the links 
to clients, for future use, the model included the bandwidth between all routers. The bandwidth between 
POPs was OC192’s for the United States model and varied in the Europe model from OC3s to OC192s. 
T1s and T3s were used for links  between the ISPs and clients.  For the purposes of the model, the average 
distance and latency to a client from an access point in a POP was needed as opposed to individual 
latencies for very client; therefore, all latencies and distances to clients were assumed to be the same. 
There were 19 POPs in the US model and 18 in the Europe model. The same structure within a POP was 
utilized in both models. The overlay nodes were client nodes in all cases. Refer to Section 4 Other 
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Figure 5: AT&T US Network 1 
 
 
Figure 6: Worldcom’s European Network2 
 
The eligible overlay nodes were evenly distributed across POPs, meaning each POP served the same 
number of client nodes eligible to be overlay nodes. In the cases where servlets and beacons were randomly 
chosen, this allowed each POP to be equally likely to have a client site that was a servlet or beacon. In the 
cases where the servlet and beacon nodes were not randomly chosen, there were more eligible nodes per 
POP than utilized and the even distribution did not impact selection. A node was not allowed to serve more 
than one purpose for a specific source-target pair, for example, a node  could not be both a beacon and a 
servlet for the same target. Removing the restriction would result in shorter routes on average because some 
scenarios tested would pick the same node for both the servlet and beacon.  
In each case, two client nodes served by each POP were included in the overlay. Since each source – target 
pair was tested individually, at most two nodes per POP would be selected to serve the functions of beacon 
and servlet. When ordering the overlay nodes according to the geographic heuristic described below, 
designating more than two nodes per POP could only change a route between a source and target by 
possibly passing through a different client on a given POP. When ordering the overlay nodes randomly and 
using CHORD as the routing algorithm for the overlay, the probability that a client on a specific POP was 
                                                 
1 Map is cropped image from http://www.cybergeography.org/atlas/more_isp_maps.html 
2 Map is cropped image from http://www1.worldcom.com/global/about/network/maps/europe/ 
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picked as a beacon or servlet, or was at a certain position in the overlay impacted the route. Since it was 
assumed overlay eligible nodes were evenly distributed across all POPs, having 2 versus 100 overlay nodes 
per POP would not impact the probabilities and thus would not affect the results. The access point for the 
source was chosen to be a client on the same POP as the source. The impact due to it being served by a 
different POP than the source would be to add the cost of the normal route between the source and access 
point to the cost of the route between the access point and target. 
3.3 Routing Algorithms 
In SOS, traffic from a source to a target utilizes a route which contains the following sequence of nodes in 
order:  source, access point, beacon, servlet  and target. Refer to Figure 1. Normal routing is used to reach 
the access point. Also, since the beacon knows the specific servlet for the target, and the servlet knows the 
location of the target, normal routing is used  between the beacon and servlet, and between the servlet and 
target. An overlay route is used between the access point and beacon. The increase in the route length over 
that of the normal route between the source and target is due not only to the requirement that the route pass 
through specific nodes, but also due to the need to route through an overlay network between the access 
point and beacon as opposed to using the normal route  between the two nodes. For normal routing, each 
node in the model contained a routing  table populated via Dijsktra’s algorithm, using minimum hops as the 
criteria for shortest path. Each node in the overlay network also contained a table with the destination 
address and overlay node id of a subset of overlay nodes. The table was populated based on the routing 
algorithms described below. 
A routing algorithm for use in overlays is required to send traffic between the access point and beacon. The 
CHORD algorithm was utilized in the first set of experiments. The overlay nodes where randomly ordered. 
The tables within each overlay node were populated using the method described above involving powers of 
2. The size of a node’s table is O(log n) where n is the size of the overlay.  
The second set of experiments used a heuristic which divided the POPs into geographical areas. This 
method is based on modifications suggested to the basic algorithm for CAN. 3 For a specific area, A, a node 
nA was chosen as the area’s representative. Each nA was an entry in each overlay node’s table. In addition, 
if ni is an overlay node in area A, ni’s table would include entries for each nj in A, i ≠ j. Thus an overlay 
node maintained pointers to every other overlay node in the same geographical area and to one overlay 
node in each other geographical area. For an overlay of size n, the size of a node’s table is O(n/5) + # of 
areas, which is O(n/5) when n is large compared to the number of areas. The US model involved 6 areas, 
one contained 2 POPs and the other contained 3 or 4 POPs each. The Europe model contained 4 areas with 
4 to 5 POPs each. 
3.4 Scenarios 
Seven source-target pairs were chosen in each of the two models. They were selected to represent a 
variation in source-target relations. Factors considered when selecting the pairs included the distance 
between cities, whether they were served by neighboring POPs and the level of connectivity for the POP.  
In all cases a servlet and beacon for a specific target were not permitted to be the same node and neither 
could serve as an access point. 
For each model and each routing algorithm,  the normal route between each source-target pair was 
computed then the following eight scenarios were tested on each pair. In the scenarios, minimizing the 
number of hops refers to the number of hops as calculated by normal routing. 
1. Randomly select the servlet and beacon. (100 trials per source-target pair were run) 
2. Select the servlet to minimize the number of hops between the servlet and target, then select the 
beacon to minimize the number of hops between the beacon and servlet, with the restriction that 
the servlet and beacon not be served by the same POP. 
                                                 
3 The heuristic used in the model was derived from two variations suggested for CAN in [2]. The use of geographic areas is based on a 
variation to incorporate geographic relations between nodes when partitioning the coordinate space. Due to the small number of areas 
in the model, the nodes are manually assigned to an area as opposed to building an algorithm to determine nodes in the same area as 
suggested in [2].  Nodes maintaining pointers to all other nodes in an area is based on the overloading of zones variation except that 
the zones will never be split. Also in [2], a node will only have a pointer to a node in another area if the areas of the two nodes border 
each other; whereas, in the heuristic, a node will have a pointer to one node in each other area. This is feasible due to the small number 
of areas in the model. 
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3. Select the servlet to minimize the number of hops between the servlet and target, then select the 
beacon to minimize the number of hops between the beacon and source. 
4. Select a servlet randomly from those approximately X miles from the target then select a beacon 
randomly from those approximately X miles from the servlet, where X was 1000 in the US model 
and 500 in the Europe model. In the case of the Europe model, a few POPs did not have neighbors 
within this distance,  in which case the next closest available overlay node was used. 
The first scenario was used to obtain an understanding of the impact when no selection criteria was utilized 
for the servlet and beacon. This would be the simplest version to implement. The second and third 
scenarios were aimed at keeping the intermediate nodes in the route near the end points to determine if the 
route between the source and target would then be similar to the normal route. These two scenarios using 
minimum distance instead if hops were tested on the US version, but the results were not noticeably 
different from the scenarios using hops. The fourth scenario was used to understand the impact of selecting 
the servlet and beacon so they would be served by different POPs than the target, which may be desired for 
diversity, but at the same time guaranteeing they would be relatively close in an attempt to avoid an 
unnecessarily  long route. 
3.5 Results 
Table 1 shows the ratio of the latency using SOS to the latency expected when using normal routing. The 
scenario number corresponds to the above list.  These were averaged over all source-target pairs.  The 
worst case from all source-target pairs is shown in Table 2. Table 3 indicates the increase in the number of 
ISP POPs involved in a route compared to that of the normal route.  
 
US Europe model and overlay 
 routing method CHORD Geographical CHORD Geographical 
scenario      
1 random selection 4.51 4.16 5.69 4.11 
2 min hops 3.45 2.4 3.25 2.54 
3 min hops  7.19 1.75 6.77 1.74 
4  diversity 5.18 4.08 5.6 2.88 
Table 1 
Average Ratio:  Latency with SOS vs Normal Route  
 
US Europe model and overlay 
 routing method CHORD Geographical CHORD Geographical 
scenario      
1 random selection –  
worst individual source-target  
average over 100 trials 
8.76 6.05 8.05 5.81 
2 min hops 7.57 3.76 4.74 3.26 
3 min hops  10.9 2.14 11.29 2.14 
4  diversity 10.57 6.24 8.1 3.57 
Table 2 
Worst Case Ratio: Latency  with SOS vs Normal Route    
 
US Europe model and overlay 
 routing method CHORD Geographical CHORD Geographical 
scenario      
1 random selection –  
worst individual source-target  
average over 100 trials 
4 3 4 2.5 
2 min hops 2 1.5 2 1.5 
3 min hops  5 1 4.2 1 
4  diversity 3.5 2.5 4.2 2 
The normal route involved 3 POPs on average in both models. 
Table 3 
Average Ratio: # of POPs in SOS Route vs # POPs in Normal Route    
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When using scenario 3 with the geographic heuristic, the servlet was always selected from a node on the 
same POP as the target and the beacon was selected from a node on the same POP as the source and access 
point because there were eligible nodes at every POP. This resulted in the SOS route being identical to the 
normal route with the addition of  a few detours to clients within the first and last POPs in the route, thus it 
was expected to produce the best results in terms of latency.  
The results reported for random selection are averaged over 100 trials run per source-target pair. The actual 
increase in latency may be much higher depending on the specific servlet and beacon chosen. The greatest 
increase occurs when the source and target are close together. The overlay route may involve points 
geographically far from the source and target, turning a normally short route into one that may traverse 
every POP in the ISP at least once. Among all trials involving random selection, the worst case in the 
Europe model was an increase in latency 15 times that of the normal route between London and Paris when 
using CHORD and 9.5 times when using the geographical heuristic. In the US model, the worst case also 
involved a latency 15 times normal  between NY and Philadelphia when using CHORD and 8.86 times 
when using the geographical heuristic. For NY to Philadelphia, the worst case increase using the 
geographical heuristic is approximately the same as the average (8.76) when using CHORD.  
Results have been reported in % increases due to the latencies being estimated. Assuming the estimates are 
correct, the worst cases from all trials involved latencies of 378ms using CHORD and 230ms using the 
geographical heuristic. These are for one direction only, source to target, so the return trip time via a 
normal route must be added. In circumstances requiring the use of SOS, it may be expected that internet 
traffic is higher than normal and thus the % increase is more relevant as a  performance measure.  
The number of POPs serves as a measure of the complexity of the route but does not necessarily imply a 
physically long route because several POPs may be geographically close. In scenario 3, the beacon would 
be selected on the same POP as the access point. The ratio for scenario 3 using CHORD is high due to a 
couple of source-target pairs in which the beacon’s overlay id was just prior to that of the access point’s id, 
resulting in routing through several overlay nodes in the path between the access point and beacon. 
When using CHORD, other variations for populating the overlay node’s tables using powers of 3 and  i + xj 
where xj is the jth number in the Fibonacci series, for  j = 3,4,5…., were tested on a subset of source-target 
pairs but had no noticeable impact on the length of the route between the access point and beacon.  A 
geographic ordering of the overlay nodes was also tested while maintaining the CHORD routing. Nodes 
that were geographically close were assigned ids placing them close together on the overlay network. 
While this shortened the route in cases where nodes X and Y were physically close, a packet was being 
routed from X to Y using the overlay and X was assigned a lower overlay id than Y; it resulted in a worst 
case scenario when Y was assigned the overlay id just prior to X’s because the packet would route to O(log 
n) overlay nodes before reaching the one that knew about X. 
4. Other Considerations 
If the overlay nodes were placed within POPs as shown below opposed to being located in clients’ LANs, 
this eliminates the latency due to the connection between the POP and client, and it could be more difficult 
to attack. In contrast to a client’s LAN which may receive traffic for multiple reasons and has a relatively 
low bandwidth connection to the POP, a server dedicated to SOS and attached to a router within a POP 
allows most invalid traffic to be filtered out in a high capacity area. However, the use of special purpose 
servers would result in fewer potential overlay nodes. Such servers would also not remove the delay due to 
cross country routes through the overlay. 
Having the overlay network span multiple ISPs will increase the latency of the SOS route. There will be a 
larger number of POPs serving potential overlay nodes. Even if the overlay nodes are geographically 
distributed in the same manner as with one ISP, the route between any pair of overlay nodes will increase 
on average due to having to route between ISPs. When the overlay nodes are in the same city but are served 
by different ISPs, having to route from one ISP POP to another ISP’s POP as opposed to routing between 
nodes within the same POP will increase latency. Furthermore, if there is no peering point between the ISPs 
for that city, the route will require a path to a different city to reach a peering point. 
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5. Conclusion 
Two factors affecting path length to consider when designing SOS are the method by which special 
purpose nodes are selected and the algorithm utilized for routing through the overlay. In order to decrease 
the probability of a successful attack, it is desirable to have no discernable relationship between the nodes 
serving special purposes in the overlay. Randomly selecting servlets and beacons accomplishes this goal. In 
contrast, setting restrictions on how these nodes are selected, such as selecting servlets within some 
distance of the target, reduces the number of overlay nodes that will be the focus of an attack if the attacker 
has some knowledge of the selection method or can make an educated guess. For example, if the attacker 
wishes to disable all potential servlets and assumes packets will not be routed across the US when the 
source and target are in neighboring cities, the attacker would conclude the servlets are in the same portion 
of the country as the target. If the actual policy is to select servlets within a specified distance of the target, 
the attacker can eliminate a significant portion of the nodes it must consider. Thus, while imposing a policy 
on how servlets and beacons are selected can reduce the path taken between the source and target, 
especially when a geographical relationship for routing has been established between overlay nodes, the  
probability of a successful attack may be lower using random selection.  
The logic for how packets are routed through an overlay can have a significant impact on the path taken. In 
the case of CHORD, even if two overlay nodes are served by the same POP, the path through the overlay 
between the two nodes may involve multiple POPs over a large geographical area. As a result, the overlay 
routing algorithm may have a greater impact on the length of the route than the method by which the 
special purpose nodes are selected. Utilizing a geographical relationship when establishing routes between  
overlay nodes reduces the route length without increasing the probability of a successful attack because the 
overlay routing algorithm is not related to how special purpose nodes are selected. If selection of special 
purpose nodes is random, packets may still route over a large geographical area even when the overlay 
route is optimized merely because of the special purpose nodes being in geographically diverse locations in 
relation to themselves, the source and the target.  However, direct routes are used between all  nodes except 
from the access point to the beacon. If a geographical relationship, such as the heuristic, is used in overlay 
routing, the path length between the access point and beacon will be relatively close to that of the normal 
route.   
If the number of overlay nodes is large enough such that utilizing a specific policy for selecting special 
purpose nodes does not  result in a non-negligible probability of a successful attack, a policy can be 
combined with geographical relationship amongst overlay nodes to set bounds on the path length and 
expected latency resulting from SOS.  
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